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I.  Introduction: Language Set Free  
 
 
The poem holds on at the edge of itself; so as to exist, it ceaselessly calls and hauls itself 
from its Now-no-more back into its Ever-yet. 
But this Ever-yet could only be an act of speaking. Not simply language and probably not 
just verbal “correspondence” either. 
But actualized language, set free under the sign of a radical individuation, which at the 
same time stays mindful of the limits drawn by language, the possibilities opened by 
language. 
This Ever-yet of poems can only be found in a poem by someone who does not forget 
that he speaks from the angle of inclination of his very being, his creatureliness.  
 
—Paul Celan 
 
Poetic expression constantly vacillates between its origin and its 
completion: it dies the moment it is born out of the speaker—it is said, it is 
done—but is continuously resurrected in the hearer or reader, so that, inasmuch as 
the expression possesses an independent existence, it exists as a potentiality. It is 
not in a fixed relationship with its meaning; rather, the meaning is cyclically 
renewed as the sublation of the dialectic between the expression itself and the 
consciousness that receives it. This is the distinction between poetic expression 
and the mere ‘correspondence’ mentioned by Celan. The ‘correspondence’ is 
directed, and remains linear; it has only one life and only one ‘correct’ meaning. It 
seems, especially to its speaker, that it can only either be comprehended or 
misunderstood against its intended meaning, with little or no grey area, while 
poetic expression has about it an aura of meaningspace.  
Poetic expression refers to more than simply poetry per se. Indeed, the 
quotation above is from a speech entitled “The Meridian” that Paul Celan gave 
when he was awarded the Georg Büchner Prize. The entire speech borders on the 
surreal; it is a poem in paragraphs, as are myriad forms of expression that might 
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be classified as something other than poetry per se. Indeed, each text that I 
consider possesses qualities of poetic expression, whether it be Bruce Fink’s 
clinical applications of Lacan’s theories on psychoanalysis, which I discuss when 
I explore the psychoanalytic construction of subjecthood, or Chögyam Trungpa’s 
inspired writings against an egoistically constructed spirituality, which are the 
foundation for my discussion of the ego within Tibetan Buddhism. But one of the 
most poetically inclined theoretical contributions to this project is arguably Gilles 
Deleuze’s text on Bergsonism, parts of which cast a brilliant light on Paul Celan’s 
words and offer a frame (though an elastic one, to be sure) for this entire project.  
In the final chapter of his text, Deleuze explores and elucidates Bergson’s 
conceptions of the possible, real,1 virtual and actual. In this model, the real 
precedes and delimits what is considered the possible; in Deleuze’s words, what 
becomes real (for the real and the possible are cyclically related to one another) is 
“ready-made…pre-existent to itself,” and, he goes on to say, “[i]n fact, it is not 
the real that resembles the possible, it is the possible that resembles the real.” 
Current ‘realities’ condition future conceptions of the possible. “Possibility” 
becomes an illusory concept, or as Deleuze says, it becomes “a false notion, the 
source of false problems.” 2 It is not difficult to see how such a false notion would 
give rise to false consciousness: perception built on delusions regarding what is—
or what can be—real. Countering false consciousness is the aim of most forms of 
spirituality, though each has different considerations regarding what constitutes 
                                                 
1
 This is not the same formulation of the real that will be used later in this paper; here, the term is 
used strictly in Bergson’s, and subsequently Deleuze’s, sense. 
2
 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism. (New York: Zone Books, 1988) 98.  
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false consciousness and what comprises true consciousness, or enlightenment. I 
would say (though this will probably be a contentious proclamation to many) that 
most systems of self-awareness, such as psychoanalysis, are intrinsically spiritual, 
as they reveal us—and what is not us—to ourselves and aid us in bringing a sense 
of meaning to life, albeit not necessarily a cosmological one.  
There is a system that is both spiritual prima facie and that closely 
parallels psychoanalysis in many ways, which is Buddhism. In this paper, I will 
be looking mainly at certain aspects of Tibetan Buddhism as well as English 
translations of Buddhist texts originally written in Sanskrit, which serve as 
foundational texts for a variety of the sects that have developed over time. False 
consciousness as I describe it above is ultimately a Buddhist concept. In much 
Buddhist thought, as we will see, false consciousness is associated with the 
cultivation of, and identification with, an ego-self that perpetuates delusion in 
order to preserve itself. This ego-self obscures a multidimensional, dynamic 
Mindspace similar to Deleuze’s conception of the virtual.  
For Bergson, and subsequently Deleuze, the virtual is, crucially, monistic: 
it is the “point of unification,” a “totality” or “Whole.”3 As this virtual Whole is 
actualized, or as it becomes actual, it follows what Deleuze calls the rules of 
“difference or divergence and creation,” while the realization of the possible is 
conditioned by “resemblance” and “limitation.”4 The virtual is linked to potential 
rather than possibility, and though this distinction may at first glance seem merely 
semantic, I think that when contemplated, it becomes clearer that possibility is in 
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many ways a negative term: it immediately implies its opposite, impossibility, 
which displays the ‘rule of limitation’ mentioned above. The ‘rule of 
resemblance’ refers to the self-referential nature of the real/possible formulation. 
Potential, on the other hand, is a more positive term with less prescriptive, more 
generative connotations, exhibiting the rules of creative differentiation attributed 
to actualization by Deleuze.  
But what does this mean in terms of language? To answer this question, I 
will turn again to Celan’s quotation: he speaks of “actualized language, set free 
under the sign of a radical individuation.” This would imply that language, too, 
springs from a virtual Wholeness, a virtual Babelian cacophony of Language, and 
that it must also undergo a process by which it moves from virtuality into 
actuality: the Language-potential is not language per se. From the simplest point 
of view, actualization, inasmuch as it necessitates differentiation, splits language 
into its various groupings: French, German, Swahili, and so forth. These 
subgroups of Language comprise smaller components, with categories and 
differentiated units overlapping as in a Venn diagram. But there is another, much 
more crucial aspect to actualization without which the process is utterly 
incomplete, which is its generative capability. Deleuze writes,  
For what coexisted in the virtual ceases to coexist in the 
actual and is distributed in lines or parts that cannot be 
summed up, each one retaining the whole, except from a 
certain perspective…These lines of differentiation are 
therefore truly creative: They only actualize by 
inventing, they create in these conditions the physical, 
vital or psychical representative of the ontological level 
that they embody.”5  
 
                                                 
5
 Deleuze 101 
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This is the real force of Celan’s quotation: actualized language is not simply 
individuated, it is radically individuated, that is, as speech calls language out of 
virtuality, it creates language anew in every moment of expression. When 
language is spoken or received by one who is in some way aware6 of the entire 
process of actualization, the creation as well as the differentiation—when spoken 
by Celan, for example—language is set free: free from its function as sheer 
signification, free from its oppressively direct correspondence to Things and 
Ideas, free from its burdensome responsibility to reason and rationality, free to 
dance, naked and joyous and shining, around the speaker to the rhythm of his 
breath.  
Celan addresses the issue of awareness directly in his quotation, when he 
insists that the ‘Ever-yet’ of poems is only apparent to someone who “does not 
forget that he speaks from the angle of inclination of his very being, his 
creatureliness.” This ‘angle of inclination’ is the angle of each individual’s 
trajectory from the foundation of Being; of animal existence. That is, it is the 
particular way in which each creature is actualized, is pulled out of amorphous 
virtuality, the differentiation that allows each person to be unique in actuality. It 
does not describe identity or a personal, fated soul, rather, it describes merely the 
plurality of human manifestation against the backdrop of undifferentiated 
creaturehood. For identity, as we will come to understand throughout this paper, is 
an artificial construction, a cancerous corruption of the angle of inclination 
                                                 
6
 When I say ‘aware’ here, I do not mean that the speaker or receiver must necessarily express the 
process in Deleuze’s or Celan’s terms, or that they must consciously follow the process step by 
step, but rather that they intuit that language is more than simply a system of signification and take 
joy in exploring and expressing that ‘more’.  
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discussed by Celan. What is commonly considered as one’s identity is amassed, 
more or less consciously, throughout a lifetime, while individuation simply 
unfolds, or develops. It is a subtle yet extraordinarily significant distinction: Celan 
is not urging that we simply be aware of the ways in which our personal identities 
or subjectivities color our receptions and communications, but rather, that we 
understand that every communication originates and terminates cyclically in the 
very fact of our subjecthood. Language can only be ‘called out’ of virtuality by 
those who understand that they themselves also underwent (and continue to 
undergo) the process of actualization, even if they do not understand it in those 
particular terms. We need to understand ourselves first as creatures before we can 
elevate ourselves as creators.  
But what constitutes our creatureliness? What comprises us, not 
physiologically, but psychologically and, indeed, spiritually? There are myriad 
answers, and no one, including myself, can offer anything other than suggestions 
and partial explanations. But if we acknowledge that our understanding is 
incomplete and varied—indeed, if we celebrate that incompleteness—we can 
begin to approach our selves and our expressions as elastic constellations: bodies 
of moments, bodies of words and sounds and light and space, dynamic and 
infinitely, infinitely open.  
7 
II(a). Constructing the Self: The Psychoanalytic Subject 
 
When ‘I’ speak (or write, express, and so forth), who or what is actually 
speaking? It would be convenient if this ‘I’ could refer to a single, unified, and 
neatly packaged individual consciousness, some individual point of reference. 
And yet, this does not appear to be the case. The poet Arthur Rimbaud said 
famously “The I is an other” (“Je est un autre”) in a letter to Paul Demeny.7 When 
he said this, Rimbaud could not have known that he was articulating one of the 
fundamental tenets of Lacanian thought. This utterance implies, at least in part, 
that the ‘I’ of speech refers to only a portion of that which constitutes what is 
generally thought of as a [unified] self. Lacan writes, “The point is not to know 
whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know 
whether, when I speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak.”8 In 
fact, ‘I’ am not the same as this self of enunciation. 
Indeed “self” itself is an especially problematic term, because, as (in 
common parlance) it points to an illusory unification, it is deceptively vague. 
However, I believe I can actually make good use of this vagueness if I use it 
deliberately, pointedly, and so from this point onward, when I use the term ‘self’ 
it will be specifically to signify this illusory unification, the sum of the parts as it 
were.  
Specifically, the ‘I’ of speech refers to the ego—the portion of the self that 
is formed during the early stages of life in what Lacan calls the “mirror phase.” 
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 Arthur Rimbaud and Claude Jeancolas, Les lettres manuscrites de Rimbaud. (Paris : Textuel, 
1997). 
8
 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits. (New York: Norton Books, 1999) 430. 
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The mirror phase, which occurs at around six to eighteen months of age, describes 
the point at which the child locates her identity in an image that is external to her: 
her own reflection. The reflection becomes for the child the “ideal ego” (not to be 
confused with the “ego-ideal”), that is, the child’s own image comes to fascinate 
her and she becomes convinced that she is this very image and that it is this 
image, this self-as-image, that the child’s mother finds desirable enough for her to 
provide the child with the necessary care. This marks the beginning of the 
fascination with the self as such, and particularly with the self as separate, and 
vulnerable in its separation. This fascination becomes a preoccupation with self-
preservation, not simply against pain or death, but for the selfhood, or identity.  
A problem then inevitably develops when the child comes to realize that 
this image only succeeds in ‘winning’ the parent’s affection, so to speak, when it 
conforms to the desire of the parent—that this “ideal ego” must succumb to an 
“ego-ideal” represented by and structured by the parents’ desire (for the child to 
do certain things at certain times, to act in certain ways, and so forth). In addition, 
the child perceives not only that her mother desires, but also that there is 
something other than the child herself that her mother desires; that the child alone 
is not sufficient to (ful)fill her mother’s desire.  
In fact, nothing is sufficient to fulfill desire. ‘Lack’ is fundamental. We 
lack, and therefore we desire, and in many senses, therefore we live dynamically 
rather than merely existing in stasis. In Freud’s thought, this dynamic quality is 
attributed to the force of Eros, which he opposes to what he labels the death 
instinct. In Lacan’s thought, life is completely based upon desire—it is easy to 
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discern an associative or connotative link between the two terms, Eros and desire. 
Despite the common usage of the term, desire in this sense is not exclusively 
sexual and does not signify fleshlust, though desire can (and does) certainly 
manifest in that way.  
Rather, ‘desire’ describes our search for something that can fill our lack, a 
doomed quest—for since lack is fundamental by definition, nothing can 
compensate for it. This is the agony of desire—the familiar experience of not 
wanting something once you get it no matter how preoccupied you were with 
desiring it. Desire absolutely cannot be satisfied; for both Freud and Lacan, 
complete satisfaction signifies death. But inevitably, in spite of the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, we cling to the belief that desire can be satisfied if only 
we had this, or that, thus setting ourselves up for constant and often devastating 
disappointment. It is in this disappointment that life as most of us know it is 
constituted: every disappointment triggers another cycle of desire, for while desire 
can manifest as conscious want, its origin is largely unconscious. Desire does not 
succumb to rationality; it does not wither in the face of disappointment or 
perceived impossibility as we might sometimes consciously attempt to force it to, 
because desire remains largely unknown to us. It is rather like a dandelion: the 
part above the surface, exposed to consciousness, is only the scantest portion of 
the whole, while the root system remains underground. And, as with a dandelion, 
eradicating the visible portion does nothing to prevent the root from generating 
another stalk. Certain egoistic approaches to meditation (as, for example, in the 
elementary stages of Buddhist meditation, before some degree of enlightenment 
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or ego-dismantling has been achieved, or as in some New Age affirmation and 
visualization techniques, among others), only address desire’s stalk rather than its 
root, and if the subject is not careful, she becomes fascinated with the very act of 
perpetually cutting the stalk and fails to do any actual uprooting. She becomes, in 
other words, caught in the critical tension between desire and satisfaction, desire 
and annihilation. 
So we are compelled to act by desires that remain largely unknown to us, 
buried in the earth of the unconscious. Perhaps we catch glimpses in struggles 
with inclinations that seem alien to us, and yet, which we cannot seem to put out 
of our minds, inclinations that drive us to do things that we do not seem to want to 
do with our conscious minds, as certain people experience when they cheat on 
their spouses, or others when they sabotage their own would-be successes by 
doing anything from oversleeping at particularly inopportune times to walking 
away at the last minute from situations in which they fully intended to participate.  
 Ultimately, what we learn from the constant cycle of desire and 
disappointment is that the disappointment is inevitable because what we actually 
desire is to desire, not to be satisfied. In its strongest manifestations desire elicits 
in us a desperate longing that is at once experienced as a lack, an emptiness that 
must be filled, but that is also strangely scintillating and utterly fascinating to its 
subject. This simultaneous experience of extreme hunger and intense satisfaction 
is what Lacan refers to as jouissance. 
While attempting to meditate one day, certain thoughts that I wrote down 
at the time in a notebook brought me to a greater, more tangible understanding of 
11 
jouissance. I am quoting the following passage more or less directly instead of 
immediately translating it into academic discourse because I think the revelatory 
nature of the experience is significant: 
 Meditation reveals to me the agony of walking the edge of a precipice—
the agony of wanting to fall because falling would kill the fear of falling; falling 
would kill the agony of walking the edge. In sitting [meditation], ‘falling’ would 
be coming out of meditation—it is almost meditating successfully that one is 
afraid of because it extends the agonizing fear of ‘failing’ to meditate. During the 
day, all I want to do is meditate, but when I actually sit down, I want to do 
anything but, even though the desire to meditate is still there, so the desire to get 
up and the desire to sit create an agonizing struggle, sometimes causing my eyes 
to pop open without my even being conscious of it. The suspension of the agony of 
continuing to sit—of succeeding to remain in agony—this can only be 
characterized as jouissance… 
The struggle with falling is in direct correlation to the relationship 
between Eros and the death instinct in Freudian thought. Freud describes Eros as a 
“sexual instinct” but goes on to say that it can also signify the instinct toward self-
preservation. The death instinct is sadistic, a collection of “destructive impulses.”9 
In the precipice scenario above, Eros would manifest as the desire to successfully 
walk the edge, while the death instinct would quite literally manifest as the desire 
to fall. Falling can be seen as a result of the unconscious causing the body to 
waver and shake (seemingly) uncontrollably. Jouissance manifests as the 
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 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id. (New York: Norton Books, 1960) 36-39.  
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overwhelming yet ecstatic strain that results from the perpetual struggle between 
Eros and what I will call the death instinct.10 The ego seems to be theoretically 
situated between these two forces, acting as a kind of mediator: when the strain 
becomes too great by the ego’s measure, it acts to distract, to deflect, to provide 
an outlet for the energy that builds up like heat between two palms rubbing 
together. This outlet can be, among other things, an outburst of anger or 
frustration, or it can be orgasm.  
It is the ego, then, that thwarts meditation in a bid for its own survival. 
Meditation is a process by which the ego can be dissipated or shattered, and far 
from being a passive participant in this process, the ego manipulates both the 
other aspects of the self, and external objects and phenomena for the purpose of 
sustaining itself and maintaining a semblance of power over the rest of the self. 
As Bruce Fink describes the ego in one of his texts on Lacan, “The consciously 
thinking subject is, by and large, indistinguishable from the ego …” and “the ego, 
according to Lacan, arises as a crystallization or sedimentation of ideal images, 
tantamount to a fixed, reified object with which the child learns to identify…”11 
The identification with the ego described here by Fink is exactly what occurs in 
the mirror stage of development discussed above.  
The fact that, as Fink goes on to say, the ego is the “seat of fixation and 
narcissistic attachment” and a “repository of misunderstanding,”12 implies further 
that our thoughts, our conscious, rationalizing, categorizing minds, are largely 
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 After Freud. Though others have gone on to label the death instinct “Thanatos,” I could find no 
such reference in Freud’s work and could subsequently conceive of no real reason to employ the 
term myself. 
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 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) 36.  
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illusory figments of our imaginations designed to compact us and cushion us 
against both the external world and, in a sense, our own jouissance. The 
unbearable tension of jouissance arises only in dichotomy with the ego, and the 
ego wants to thwart it because it is the very experience or apprehension by the 
other aspects of ‘self’ of the ego’s fault lines as it were; its weakness or, in 
Lacanian terms, its lack. In meditation specifically, jouissance is a manifestation 
of the ego’s resistance to the process of its own dismantling. Breaking the 
meditation (or meditation attempt) also breaks the tension, and while this can 
induce a feeling of relief, it constitutes an acquiescence to the ego’s resistance.  
To understand how the ego performs its protective functions, we need to 
understand the relationship of the ego to the rest of the self, namely, to the 
unconscious. Lacan said that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other13 and 
that this Other is the Symbolic, or language. The significance of this should not be 
underplayed. A person’s unconscious dictates to an extreme extent that person’s 
actions, speech, his wants and desires, and his relationships, both romantic and 
platonic. The conscious mind thinks itself to be in control of most of these aspects 
of life. In fact, its primary function is to rationalize (often through disavowal) or 
qualify the choices that actually flow from the unconscious as water from an 
underground spring, or as light from a small crack in the door.  
This is not to say that the unconscious is the “real” or “true” subject or 
self, obscured by the ego and drowned out by the din of the conscious mind. 
Every aspect of the self is tenuous, every aspect lacks stasis, and in some way 
eludes signification, including the unconscious. This elusion is due to the very 
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nature of language: language as the Symbolic precludes the Real, that which 
logically precedes the Symbolic, or in other words, that which signifiers 
theoretically reference, though this referential relationship is obviously largely 
illusory. In fact, the Symbolic overtakes and supercedes the Real, renders it a 
mere fanciful idea that trails behind the feet of the Symbolic, a shadow.  
Fink describes the Lacanian conception of the unconscious as a “continual 
playing out of a signifying chain excluded from consciousness, in which 
knowledge of a certain kind is embodied, is permanent in nature; in other words, 
it subsists throughout an individual’s life.”14 The unconscious is made up of the 
pieces of information and communication that have been lost to the conscious 
mind, that did not fit there per se. These ‘pieces,’ then, can only be signifiers, 
rather than the emotions or unsignified impulses that many imagine to constitute 
the unconscious.  
That these pieces are left over from a person’s own experience explains 
why each person’s unconscious affects them differently, and appears to constitute 
him as some kind of Real ‘individual’ while all the time actually being strictly 
structured by the Symbolic, a condition which precludes such Real individuality. 
Indeed, Fink states this unequivocally: “Now this ‘other’ subject…is not 
something which or someone who has some sort of permanent existence: it only 
appears when a propitious occasion presents itself. It is not some kind of 
underlying substance or substratum.”15  
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The ego, then, acts as a lens, warping and manipulating the material of the 
unconscious (what, in the model of the lens, could be considered as the ‘light’ that 
passes through) when a “propitious occasion” allows portions of its material to 
manifest in the conscious mind. In a sense, the ego serves to naturalize the 
contents of the unconscious so that a person cannot discern the linguistically 
structured nature of her desire. Instead, she feels her thoughts and actions to 
belong to her in some fundamental way, to constitute something that can be called 
an identity, something that is unique to her. Paradoxically, such identities are 
usually attached to signifiers, they have labels, and these labels affect—these 
labels actually set the course for—the ways in which these identities manifest in a 
person. In other words, these identities are absolutely linguistically structured.  
Slavoj Žižek writes, “One does something, one counts oneself as (declares 
oneself) the one who did it, and, on the base of this declaration, one does 
something new—the proper moment of subjective transformation occurs at the 
moment of declaration, not at the moment of the act.”16 It is important to consider 
the fact that such “declarations” do not have to occur at a social level, or even at 
the level of speech, but indeed actually occur most often at the level of thought: 
we constantly declare ourselves to ourselves, a process by which we are 
continuously reified as “individuals,” or “personalities.” Not only this, but, as 
Žižek notes, it is a process that structures, rather than describes, how we act and 
speak.  
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16 
 It should be obvious by now that the ego’s role in this process of 
reification is far from incidental. However, Fink is careful to point out that “in 
Lacan’s version of psychoanalysis the ego is clearly not an active agent, the agent 
of interest being the unconscious.”17 This is why I have referred to the ego as a 
“lens,” something that can passively manipulate that which passes through it. It 
could also be thought of as a prism, something that bends and deconstructs a 
blended beam so its components may be discernable to the conscious eye. 
However, this image should not lead one to believe that the ego’s function is 
organizational in some kind of objectively correct way, for, to reiterate, “the ego 
is…a repository of misunderstanding” more akin to a broken mirror.18  
Self, then, in the psychoanalytic sense, is an empty signifier, pointing 
toward a unity that simply does not exist as such. Rather than being a whole that 
is “greater than the sum of its parts,” as the saying goes, we are in fact almost less 
than the sums of our parts. Our parts eclipse ‘us,’ dissolve ‘us,’ stand in ‘our’ 
places like so many cardboard cutouts. Each aspect of the ‘self’ signifies only the 
very impossibility of the existence of a unified, concrete ‘self.’ Superficially, one 
could say this is true of all aspects of the self except for the ego, the function of 
which is to signify this exact possibility of unity, and even to signify this 
possibility as an already-present reality. However, we must remember that the ego 
would in fact be completely superfluous if such a possibility were ‘real,’ for if the 
‘self’ were actually unified and concrete, we would not need the ego to 
continuously convince us of that fact.  
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II(b). Constructing the Self: The Buddhist Subject 
 
There is the ego, and there is something else. Something that the ego is 
other from, something untouchable and unchanging. Something that is not the 
“actions, the mental events.”19 Something that is not anguish or pride, or self-
doubt. But what, then, is it? Before attempting to elucidate what this “other” 
might consist of, I think it is important to grasp what indeed is meant by “ego” in 
this slightly different context. It might seem as though the ego is identifiable or 
synonymous with the subject, that which comprises the actual self. However, in 
Buddhist ideology, the ego is seen as something illusory that is, paradoxically, to 
be cut away so that one’s true nature20 might be discovered. The judging ego is a 
“level of complication that takes us a long way from the basic simplicity of what 
we are.”21 The ego is craving, the ego is punishment, the ego is worry, and, 
perhaps most significantly, the ego is thought and most speech. It is elusive and 
quite difficult to discuss academically. It is like a garment to be worn into the 
world, but one so intricate and worn so often it has become confused with the 
naked skin. We have forgotten what we are beneath the splendid robes we have 
woven. And the robe itself is constructed of so many beautiful and varying layers 
that even in trying to strip it off we grow confused as to what is actually beneath 
it.  
 One of the most poignant aspects of Buddhism as a spiritual (rather than 
purely philosophical) tradition is that it actually provides a method for slicing 
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through the layers of ego (as does the Western practice of psychoanalysis). Most 
sects of Buddhism, including the three vehicles of Tibetan Buddhism,22 focus 
more on right action than on subscription to delineated beliefs. It is a testament, 
then, to ego’s power that despite thousands of years of development, even the 
method that Buddhism employs is far from failsafe: “The problem is that ego can 
convert anything to its own use, even spirituality,” Kagyu lineage-holder 
Chögyam Trungpa writes in his 1973 text Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism. 
The ego is destructively clever, appropriating everything, even attempts to 
undermine it, in order to strengthen itself.23  
 Ego develops from what Trungpa calls the “basic ground,”24 a state (or 
perhaps more accurately, space) characterized by openness and spontaneity. 
Trungpa relates this basic ground to the state of innocence before the fall in 
traditional Judeo-Christian mythology; in psychoanalysis, this may correspond to 
the experience of being in utero, to Lacan’s pre-alienation ‘Real,’ or, in some 
ways, to Freud’s conception of the ‘oceanic feeling.’ Trungpa asserts that we still 
experience—if only unconsciously, as it would be too instantaneous and elusive 
to capture with the mind—this state sometimes when we see some thing with 
which we are not familiar. Just before we try to make sense of it by categorizing 
it, we perceive it as it is, even if only for an instant. It is the space between 
perception and conceptualization. It is not void, per se, but a space in which to 
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move freely rather than a structured space; a space that inherently includes a sort 
of “primordial intelligence.”25  
 In Trungpa’s model, at the very beginning, in infanthood, ‘I’ and this 
space are indistinguishable. Infants are not immediately self-conscious, rather, 
self-consciousness is a result of becoming increasingly active in the space; of 
interacting with the space through our senses. At some point, “we begin to spin 
more than was necessary to express the space.”26 So, it seems to be a matter of the 
space and the ‘self’ beginning in a state not of utter indiscernibility, but of 
symbiosis, co-operation. We are like liquid in a container—if we are still, or if we 
only move about within the container, we conform to the container and seem 
indistinguishable from it, but if we become too active and slosh over the sides, we 
realize that we are separate. There may seem to be a problem with this metaphor: 
the container is a structured space whereas “basic ground” is supposed to be 
utterly open, but in fact, the moment we become self-conscious, the space 
solidifies. This is the introduction of duality to the consciousness, the experience 
that ‘I’ am separate from ‘space.’ As Trungpa says, this is the birth of “form,” of 
“other.”27 It is also, therefore, the birth of ego. 
  So ego represents a sort of fundamental illusion, a fundamental ignorance 
of what we are in fact. It is an impulse to define our selves as ‘individual,’ to be 
uniquely significant in some way, to push toward ever-increasing separation. It 
becomes increasingly elaborate as it develops, employing emotion and concept to 
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prop it up, channeling the primordial intelligence of the basic ground into a logic-
based intellectual intelligence.28  
 The ego, then, is tricky. It cannot accurately be called ‘real,’ because it is a 
construct and it cannot accurately be called ‘unreal’ because it exists; because, if 
left unchecked, it determines our actions and communications, and therefore our 
lives and societies. It is too powerful to be simply unreal, much like the concept 
of God. But whether one wants to label ego ‘real’ or not, what is actually 
significant is simply that it is not fundamentally what we are. The Bodhisattva, or 
one who seeks enlightenment in the Buddhist sense, must acknowledge that all 
beings are essentially ego-less. That is to say, nothing possesses an essential 
selfhood or personality; nothing exists as an independent, concrete unit. This is an 
interesting paradox: the ego is not supposed to exist—again, even in Lacan’s 
conception of the ego, it has no agency—and yet ‘it’ exerts a staggering influence 
upon us. In fact, most of the mental processes of which we are aware—that is, the 
contents of our conscious minds—are either wholly produced or mitigated by the 
ego. How could it simply not exist? Finding the solution requires resisting the 
inclination to reify such terms as “exist” and “not exist.” In reality, the ego is 
neither existent nor nonexistent. The ego is an illusion, which effectively amounts 
dialectically to a third classification of Being: something that does not ‘exist’ but 
still influences. It is similar in many ways to Deleuze’s conception of the virtual, 
that which exists, but as potentiality, except that the ego, rather than undergoing 
actualization in the Deleuzian sense, has been misidentified as real, as it is 
mistakenly assumed to be the source of consciousness (I think, therefore I am), 
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and therefore the source of possibility and impossibility; the source of judgments 
pertaining to reality.  
 Trungpa repeatedly characterizes the mind and the ego (as the mind is, in 
effect, the seat of the ego) as neurotic. It is as if the ego is somehow aware of how 
tenuous it is, as though constantly reasserting its control over the mind is not 
enough for it—it must also ensure that the mind does nothing to flush it out, as we 
saw in the discussion of jouissance. Like a parasite, everything we take in feeds 
the ego, though we might think we are feeding ourselves, and we are always left 
hungry, unsatisfied by what we take in. As the solidification of the ego progresses 
over time, so does our hunger, and we grow increasingly jealous, often sabotaging 
relationships in order to preserve our egos. The ego does not easily accept blame, 
it does not want to come up short, and so it justifies itself using emotion and 
intellect in order to protect its self against the challenges that an other inevitably 
poses to it. But preserving the ego essentially maintains our hunger: the 
(unenlightened) Buddhist subject, like the psychoanalytic subject, is constituted 
by desire. This constant defensiveness creates anxiety that for many people 
borders on unbearable, and it is not difficult to comprehend how this anxiety 
could give way to neurosis.  
Generally speaking, most communication serves only to further reinforce 
the ego. ‘We’ speak to convince others and our selves that we are solid, real 
entities, and positive, morally justified entities at that. We communicate in 
different ways depending on ‘who’ we are trying to solidify ourselves as being. 
“Usually when we communicate with another person, we are driven by a kind of 
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neurotic speed.”29 We build a kind of cocoon when speaking and are impelled to 
render it impenetrable, often using logic to make something inarguable that 
another listener might feel intuitively is off. When used this way, language is one 
of the most effective tools of the ego, especially in a society in which logic and 
rationality are prized above most other virtues.  
In this context, linguistic expression is reduced to the manipulation of 
certain symbols for the neurotic purpose of creating, reinforcing, or even 
elevating, oneself. The communication in question does not have to be of a 
particularly grandiose nature for this to occur, rather, it happens in even the most 
mundane interactions. When relating events to a friend, for example, one often 
uses words in such a way as to put a particular slant on the story, so that the 
perceived antagonist of the situation may seem more solidly abusive, or pompous, 
or envious, and so forth. It is usually extremely subtle, so much so that a third 
party observing both the initial situation and the recounting might not even be 
able to call the story inaccurate, but would simply chalk the discrepancies up to 
differences in interpretation. 
Interpretation is almost entirely ego-driven: “Whenever we begin to feel 
any discrepancy or conflict between our actions and the teachings, we 
immediately interpret the situation in such a way that the conflict is smoothed 
over.”30 One could replace “the teachings” (here intended to mean Buddhist 
teachings) with almost any doctrine. The idea of ego-as-interpreter is essentially 
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the basis for the belief that one needs a “spiritual friend” or guru to aid one on the 
Buddhist path: “written teachings are always open to the interpretation of ego.”31   
This is simple enough to consider. Much more difficult is figuring out how 
to avoid participating in such interpretation, as the ego is quite skilled at 
masquerading interpretation as simple comprehension. Susan Sontag’s essay 
Against Interpretation offers a perspective that, though not Buddhist per se, has 
much in common with Trungpa’s elucidation of the subject. Of interpretation 
Sontag writes: “It makes art into an article for use, for arrangement into a mental 
scheme of categories.”32 One could replace “art” with almost any word one 
wished, for the function of the ego in Buddhist ideology as interpretative agent 
quantifies and categorizes everything in order to transform the world from a 
chaotic mass into concise, manageable portions.  
This process inevitably entails massive oversimplification of the 
complexities inherent in [R]eality. And the ego certainly does not oversimplify 
objectively; rather, it oversimplifies, or interprets, in a way that serves (either 
positively or negatively) the neuroses and desires that were formed by the ego in 
the first place. The ego-as-lens, or the ego-as-broken-mirror, warps everything 
along a similar trajectory, thus causing the illusion of unity, and often of near-
stasis, among the (actually dynamic) aspects of the ‘self.’ It is not uncommon in 
Buddhist thought for the illusory nature of the ego to be associated with the 
deluding qualities of some forms of linguistic interchange, as in the Lankavatara 
Scripture, when the Buddha says,  
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“It is this combination of discrimination of 
imaginary marks of individuality, grouping them 
and giving them a name and becoming attached to 
them as objects, by reason of habit-energy that has 
been accumulated since beginningless time, that one 
builds up erroneous views whose only basis is false-
imagination. For this reason, Bodhisattvas should 
avoid all discussions relating to assertions and 
negations whose only basis is words and logic.”33  
 
Here Buddha cautions against the use of rhetoric by the ego, the use of language 
only to signify Things and Ideas, to establish and perpetuate rationality.  
In the Surangama Sutra,34 Gotama Buddha offers a more extensive 
elucidation on the illusory nature of selfhood and the processes of the conscious, 
rational mind. The metaphor he employs deals, unsurprisingly, with language and 
more specifically, with the physiological effects that words can induce: the saliva 
the mouth produces when one speaks about sour plums or the way the body 
wavers when the mind thinks of falling. The ego acts on the mind and the body 
like a word. Even the seemingly visceral aspects of conscious experience—as 
opposed to thought, which is more difficult to qualify or describe as a 
commonality—have their bases in the self- or ego-illusion. 
For example, to our conscious minds, sensory information is seemingly 
divided physiologically by virtue of the various sense organs and we perceive 
such information as belonging to, or corresponding with, its respective body part. 
Indeed, the senses are usually taken for granted as fundamental, and perceptions 
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based on the senses are often considered inarguably concrete. However, in the 
Surangama Sutra, the Buddha asserts that this is an illusory understanding of 
sense perception cultivated by the thinking mind (or ego) in (what I shall call) its 
campaign for organized selfhood. Empirical information gathered from the 
senses, therefore, is not to be taken for granted as representing some kind of 
objective, observable ‘fact.’ In the unenlightened subject, then, the senses serve 
mainly as tools for the ego, and as such, they both condition that subject’s 
reactions to her environment and help to continuously trigger her desire. 
While the unenlightened Buddhist subject is ego-driven and constituted by 
an insatiable desire, the enlightened Buddhist subject is another matter. 
Enlightenment is simply the process of dissolving the ego-illusion: The 
Bodhisattva comes to understand that the web of associations and dualities that 
the thinking mind comprises is an overgrown tangle that obscures what the 
scriptures alternately call the Intuitive Mind, the Essential Mind, and the 
Enlightening Essence of Mind, among other similar titles. In this Mind, 
knowledge does not result from information gathered from the various sense 
organs and organized by the rational mind. Instead, knowledge arises intuitively 
by virtue of the essential clarity of the Mind once the thicket of associations is cut 
through and pulled away.35  
This Essential Mind is not a god or even an underlying universal self, like 
the atman-brahman construction in some forms of Hinduism. Despite its English 
title, it does not even really constitute an essence in the strict sense of the word: it 
is not a ‘fundamental nature,’ nor does it possess any ‘inherent characteristics,’ 
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for both of these terms imply differentiation. The Essential Mind is, essentially, 
empty. That is not to say that it is not-full; it does not imply a duality. The 
corresponding Sanskrit term is sunyata, which expresses the paradigm, “form is 
emptiness and emptiness is form.” This should not be understood as some kind of 
koan, or alternately as some vague statement that implies that “everything is one,” 
or something of the sort. Rather, sunyata expresses the emptiness of all concepts 
of form, form as being devoid of any inherent meaning or significance, any 
identity, or ego—and this includes signifiers, such as “emptiness,” or “sunyata,” 
itself. However, the term also expresses the fact that in our rational minds, 
emptiness itself also becomes a form, takes on the solidity of a concept. Through 
its dual connotation, the term signifies an emptiness that remains tenuously 
unconceptualized. The Essential Mind, then, exists as unreified, undifferentiated, 
virtual space. It is what I will later describe as “awareness-without-self.”  
The Buddha describes Essential Mind as a handkerchief, comprised of 
many threads that form one fabric, and compares the senses and the thinking mind 
to knots tied in the handkerchief.36 Buddhist meditation practices and, 
subsequently, the process of enlightenment serve, in effect, to untie the knots in 
order to restore the Essential Mind to its essential[ly empty] form. While the path 
offered by Buddhism (in its various forms and sects) consists of extremely 
specific rituals and ideologies, there are myriad ways to begin dismantling the ego 
and restoring joyful, clear awareness to the Mind. One of these ways—the one 
that I will discuss in the next section of this paper—is to reassess and revise our 
relationships to language. For it is through language that we communicate both to 
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each other and ourselves, and it is through language that we differentiate Things 
from one another. When linguistic expression serves the ego, the differentiated 
units become reified and help to propel the cycle of delusion and desire. But, as 
we will see, this does not have to be the case. 
28 
III. The Spiritual Value of Poetic Expression 
 
I said above that we speak to convince our selves and others of our 
enduring solidity, our person-ality, our specific selfhood; I said, in other words, 
that communication generally serves the purposes of the ego. However, I am 
inclined to believe that this has more to do with the trajectory that most 
communication follows—the ego-lens through which it is projected—than with 
some fundamental quality of communication or of language. For though Lacan 
tells us that it is essentially the unconscious that speaks, if the ego conditions 
sensory perception and rational thought, it is not too far a leap to say that it 
conditions speech as well (remember Lacan’s image of the ego-as-sieve). 
However, Buddha notes in the Surangama Sutra that the senses have 
transcendental potential, as does the thinking mind. Might not speech, or 
linguistic communication in general, also carry with it the potential for 
transcendental existence?  
It is important here to note that, especially in the Buddhist sense, but for 
my own purposes also, the term “transcendental” does not imply that these 
aspects are somehow separate from or dualistically counter to the ego-based 
processes. Instead, I would recall the image of the handkerchief used in section II 
to represent the Essential Mind—the handkerchief in its simplest, unknotted form 
is what is thought of as transcendental here.  
The Buddha discusses transcendental sight in the Surangama Sutra, first 
describing how what I will call ego-sight involves perceiving sights through the 
lenses both of one’s past conditioning and the subsequent desires created by it. He 
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goes on to say that in so-called transcendental sight, “when you let your eyes 
perceive anything, if you let the sensation of seeing pass unheeded, not letting any 
discriminating thoughts of judgment arise in your mind, this unties all knots and is 
the genuine freedom…”37 It is possible to have a similar relationship to words, to 
language. Words can pass through the mind and over the lips, or out of the 
fingers, just as visions of objects can pass through the eyes and back into the 
mind. For just as words serve as placeholders for Concepts and Things, so do 
sights. The non-transcendental vision of an object is already not-the-object-itself 
but is, rather, immediately an idea of the object and, as I suggested above, the 
same holds true for sounds, for smells, sensations of touch—no experience is 
purely empirical. This idea is not wholly novel to Western thought. Indeed, in 
Book VII of his Seminar Lacan says, “A sensory apparatus, Freud tells us, doesn’t 
only play the role of extinguisher or of shock-absorber…but also plays the role of 
sieve.”38 Words are not anomalous; they alone do not alienate us from experience 
or from some undifferentiated ‘Reality’ any more than does the rest of our ego-
selves. The ego just has not found it quite as easy to appropriate, assimilate, and 
naturalize language as it has the seemingly empirical aspects of Being. 
In actuality, in the Buddhist sense, there is no objective order of reality 
from which words can alienate us. We must recall sunyata (form is emptiness; 
emptiness is form) to even begin to comprehend this. Even without, or perhaps 
rather before language, all that exists of reality are our concepts of it. The thinking 
mind precedes language; if it did not, how could it acquire and assimilate 
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language in the first place? Lacan, for one, developed vast theories based on the 
perceptions of infants, especially regarding their relationships to their mothers, 
before they really encounter language. Even many animals, specifically mammals, 
harbor impressions of the world that create myriad realities, as evidenced by the 
behavior of those who have been abused or mistreated, versus those who have 
not.   
Therefore, words, while they stand for Things, stand for Things that do 
not in fact exist as such; that are not concrete or objective, even in the pre-
linguistic sphere. In the Lankavatara Scripture, the Buddha tells his disciple 
Mahamati, “Discrimination of meaning is based upon the false-imagination that 
these sweet sounds which we call words and which are dependent upon whatever 
subjects they are supposed to stand for, and which subjects are supposed to be 
self-existent, all of which is based on error [sic]”39 (emphasis added). Alternately, 
in the Diamond Sutra, the Buddha tells disciple Subhuti repeatedly that when he 
uses words to communicate, he intends them only as a “figure of speech,” going 
on to say, “But, Subhuti, as soon as I have spoken of these Buddhas and their 
Dharmas, I must recall the words, for there are no Buddhas and no Dharmas.”40 
When used in certain ways, words can actually express their own tenuousness and 
impermanence; it is the ego that clings to words as having permanent, objective 
meanings, or signifying concrete aspects of reality.  
If, as in many of the Buddhist sutras, the thinking mind is viewed as the 
sixth sense, then language is a kind of seventh, and Lacan’s vision of the 
                                                 
39
 Goddard 285 (Lankavatara Scripture) 
40
 Goddard, 89-90 (Diamond Sutra)  
31 
unconscious as being structured by the Symbolic, or language, makes as much 
sense and seems as obvious as the statement that our conscious experience is 
structured by our other six senses. Perhaps it will be argued that what are 
commonly considered the five senses can rightly be called “senses” as such 
because they have a physiological basis, or because they are fundamental and do 
not have to be learned or acquired in the way that language does. However, the 
perceptions produced by sensory organs vary incredibly from human to human; 
also, these perceptions are often learned and shared culturally: preferences for 
certain flavors, or differing definitions of beauty. While grammar, reading, and 
writing must generally be studied and learned scholastically, verbal 
communication is adopted at an extremely young age and, at least in the case of 
one’s primary language, is acquired through a process that is largely inscrutable to 
those undergoing it. Children have the sense to mimic many of the words they 
hear spoken by adults, and to understand both that words are not just sounds—that 
they carry or point toward ‘meaning’—and that the linguistic system is more than 
the sum of its signifiers: children learn early how to use the words they know to 
structure new and varied sentences. Language is not an external tool or object that 
we pick up and utilize, it is part of our very being.  
Language, then, is not merely the ego’s plaything. In fact, in many ways 
ego is terrified of language: of what it can reveal and of how powerful it can 
actually be. When linguistic expression resonates with a hearer, or a reader, the 
affective bond that is formed between that reader and that expression can be so 
profound as to elicit a physiological response, in the form of tears, or laughter, 
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chills, or supreme joy. And while the other senses reel in and assimilate bits of 
information like spun sugar around a paper stick, serving, as I mentioned earlier, 
to build some illusory opacity or solidity that can be labeled a “self,” the 
expressive language-sense reaches out from somewhere ‘behind’41 this opacity. It 
has the potential to penetrate the limits of the expresser’s opacity and, rarely but 
magnificently, to breach the limit of the other’s as well—that is, to shatter ego-
selfhood, and expose it not only as illusory, but as unnecessary and actually 
antithetical to true, fulfilling expression. Linguistic expression is how we come to 
understand one another, and while much communication occurs among egos, that 
which does not serves only to help decimate them. 
Thus the ego’s aversion. But so pervasive is language and so necessary is 
some form or degree of linguistic expression that ego cannot simply resist or 
ignore it. Instead, it must find a way to subjugate language, to use it for ego’s own 
preservation. Fink writes of the disparity between ego discourse, which is directed 
toward constructing and discussing an ‘I’ or self, and unconscious discourse, 
which, as I mentioned above, consists of repressed signifiers and portions of 
signifiers. This latter discourse often inserts itself, quite uninvited, into ego 
discourse in the form of slips of the tongue and in signifiers that appear in 
dreams.42 The ego does this by turning language on itself, which is the point at 
which words become fodder both for rhetoric, used to manipulate people’s 
emotions, and logic games, used to prove ‘truths’ that are at best contrived and at 
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worst oppressive, constituting a kind of violence. Luce Irigaray discusses the 
issue in terms of gender difference when she writes that men, and subsequently 
male discourse, are “structured in accordance with civil and religious norms that 
drastically reduce and transform reality” by excluding or disappearing the 
feminine.43  
Similar dynamics are at work in any uneven exchange, whether the 
discrepancy be educational, or economic, or so forth. Even when the ‘self’ is 
interacting among itself, the exchange can be uneven. The ego attempts to exact 
destruction or at least subjugation on the aspects of self that it cannot fully 
incorporate. It uses its powers of rationalization and interpretation to bring the 
disparate aspects under its control: sometimes by referring to a moral authority 
that seems to require those aspects to be hated and repented; sometimes by 
belittling and disavowing them as ‘stupid’ or ‘childish,’ though of course there are 
even myriad other ways in which ego-violence manifests. Ego approaches the 
other in much the same way as it approaches the disparate elements of the self. It 
sees the other as a threat to its solidity and either turns on the other, as in the 
hegemonic model described by Irigaray, or uses the threat to turn back on its self 
(the disparate elements as compromising the ego’s solidity and weakening it in its 
exchange with the other, and so forth). For in its linguistic exchange with the 
other, the ego often employs rhetoric and wordgames to render the other—or the 
‘other’ within the self—irrefutably ‘wrong’ and so sooth itself by repairing the 
gape opened by the very fact of the encounter with the other. Though there is a 
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violent aspect to the process of shattering the ego as well, it is a purifying 
violence, a redemptive violence, and one in which language is liberated from the 
interests of the ego.  
The ego warps language but then, when words inevitably fail to satisfy the 
ego, it denounces them and conjures fantasies of a higher reality that remains 
untainted by language, a kind of prelinguistic Eden where the ego can enjoy full 
satiation through direct apprehension of some deliciously solid ultimate truth.44 In 
this model, a duality arises in which signifiers become the mundane and the 
signified becomes the sacred: something for which humans can only grasp with 
grammatical rituals, clung to desperately by those who nervously maintain that 
there is something to all of this, something behind it all. In fact, there is not. 
Words are not symbols of some strictly defined order of sacrality as is a crucifix, 
or even a mandala, but they can seem so when Reality becomes mythic through 
ego’s tireless efforts to apprehend it. In the Buddhist sense, Reality consists of the 
Essential Mind described in section II; in the Lacanian sense, Reality, or the Real, 
is theoretically comprised of a direct relationship to experience that is unmitigated 
by language, though we have seen (and Lacan even notes) that experience as such 
is never unmitigated.  
Language is, in effect, all there is, not in the sense that words themselves 
actually constitute objective Reality, but rather in the sense that, despite the 
Buddha’s argument to the contrary in the Lankavatara Scripture,45 words can 
                                                 
44
 This can even come into play in seemingly ‘spiritual’ processes—indeed, Chögyam Trungpa’s 
Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism is aimed at dissolving these egoistic forms of spirituality—
but those who truly know the ego to be illusion know this fantasy to be illusory as well.  
45
 “Words…cannot express highest Reality” Goddard, 287 (Lankavatara Scripture).  
35 
express Reality. That is not to say that words can signify Reality, that “Reality” as 
some Thing can hold the place of signified, which is what the Buddha may have 
been arguing against, but rather that each word carries the Real within it as a 
balloon carries space. The Real, or Reality, itself constitutes and is constituted by 
space: the space between words, the space around words, the space of breath, of 
silence, the space into which we reach for the Thing whispered to us by the word 
and come up empty-handed.  
Around this space abides a series of tentative truths:46 that, as Saussure 
taught us, differentiation is arbitrary; that differentiated units only have 
significance in terms of their relationships to each other; that this system of 
relationships is in constant flux. Saussure once said, “A language is a system 
which is intrinsically defenseless against the factors which constantly tend to shift 
relationships between signal and signification. This is one of the consequences of 
the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign.”47 The arbitrariness of ‘truth,’ and 
‘reality’48 (as abstractions posited by the ego) has similar consequences: the 
relationships between moments, perceptions, and concepts evolve with time, as 
new experiences and concepts are added to the index of self. The ego constantly 
repositions itself in the light of these additions in order to assimilate them in such 
a way that they do not challenge its solidity; in other words, it rationalizes the 
additions in a way that minimizes the challenges they pose to the ego’s solidity. 
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The staunch absolutism displayed by the ego—especially regarding the solidity of 
its self and of the signifiers that its identity comprises—denies this elasticity, this 
space, which the continuous flux of existence implies. 
The space that I am discussing should not be considered an abstraction, as 
there exist numerous examples of encounters with linguistic space. For example, 
in Freud’s essay “Antithetical Sense of Primal Words,” he references with 
reverence and fascination a pamphlet published by one K. Abel that describes an 
ancient Egyptian language in which each word signified a thing as well as its 
opposite. The pamphlet takes as a particular example the word ken, which meant, 
as Abel puts it, “strongweak.” Regarding the construction Abel writes, “In reality 
this word indicated neither ‘strong’ nor ‘weak,’ but the relation between the two, 
and also the difference between them which created both in equal proportion 
…Man has not been able to acquire even his oldest and simplest conceptions 
otherwise than in contrast with their opposite; he only gradually learnt to separate 
the two sides of the antithesis…”49 (Incidentally, this theory bears remarkable 
resemblance to Buddhist conceptions of the evolution of differentiation.) But the 
linguistic space does not always imply a space of opposition, as in the context of 
Freud’s paper, but can also be simply a space of otherness. The phrase, “you are 
still in the window,” from my poem The Collector, which is printed in full later in 
the text, may serve as a useful example.50 
The phrase can mean either that the person whom the speaker is 
addressing has remained in the window for some time, or that the person is 
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motionless in the window. If I had intended to signify directly and literally either 
of the possible interpretations, I would have done so. However, in poetic 
expression, such nonoppositional linguistic space can be employed to impart both 
interpretations simultaneously. Every word carries something of this space and 
even most non-poetic utterances have multiple meanings depending on their 
contexts, but the difference between poetic and non-poetic expression is that 
encounters with poetic expression can trigger an experience that transcends mere 
comprehension of the intended signification of the expression, and is itself felt to 
be ineffable, though it was accessed linguistically. With non-poetic expression, 
the space may be acknowledged rationally, but it is not experienced affectively. 
Marcel Proust encountered this space when he discovered the relationship 
between language and memory in an event that Walter Benjamin recounts in his 
Illuminations: “Proust, complaining of the barrenness and lack of depth in the 
images of Venice that his mémoire volontaire presented to him, notes that the 
very word ‘Venice’ made that wealth of images seem to him as vapid as an 
exhibition of photographs.”51 Language, viz. the word Venice is connected to 
Proust’s mémoire involontaire, which is the previously unconscious memory-
sense evoked through contact with a material object, in this case a word. Of 
course, the other way to conceive of mémoire involontaire is as memoryspace, 
with mémoire volontaire as the collection of moment-objects, the cluttered 
narrative of selfhood. Mémoire involontaire ‘consists’ of experience that the ego 
has not managed to collect and assimilate.  
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It is important to remember that for the vast majority of people the ego has 
complete command of conscious perception, with the result that most experience 
not processed by the conscious ego impresses itself upon the unconscious 
instead.52 These impressions still affect conscious experience but in ways that are 
not immediately clear or scrutable to the ego. Freud wrote that the unconscious 
“has no other aim than to force its way through the pressure weighing on it [by the 
ego]…” As Freud notes repeatedly in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the ego is 
assailed both from without and within, and with that, we’re back to Rimbaud: The 
I is an other, an other for which the unconscious has little regard. When suddenly 
faced with an object—including a linguistic object—that is pregnant with 
memoryspace, we experience a stopmoment in which we come up against the 
limits of ego-being, of a selfhood that excludes so much of what constitutes us. A 
succession of these stopmoments can begin to perforate our ego-selves, but such 
instances cannot be contrived by the ego, as when it reacts to emotionally 
manipulative expressions like the soundtracks of many Hollywood dramas or 
impassioned political proselytizing. Rather, such moments are catalyzed by 
chance encounters with the linguistic object, pregnant with space.53 
This space is inherent in the linguistic object; however, we have come to 
see that it is continuously obscured to most of us by a constant process of 
reification, whereby words are concretized and misidentified with the Things they 
are supposed [/we suppose them] to signify. We imbue words with undue weight 
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so that they become burdensome; no word or phrase feels like enough to say what 
one wants to say, so we qualify words with other words and drag them behind us, 
ever collecting. The space of the Real is sensed, but as something to be lamented 
rather than celebrated, as an inadequacy. In Lacan’s thought, though lack 
fundamentally cannot be filled, we can learn through the psychoanalytic process 
to enjoy our incompleteness, to possess an awareness, rather than a fear, of our 
lack. The case is similar with language. The limit of representation—the elusive 
boundary between language and linguistic space—terrifies ego-beings, as it is in 
actuality a limitation on the ego’s ability to represent its self, its identity, in any 
concrete sense. When we cease to be motivated and conditioned by the various 
forms of the ego’s paranoia, we can actually learn to enjoy the limitation of its 
representability. In acknowledging openly that our languages, and subsequently 
our selves, are limited, we can begin to explore the space beyond those 
limitations; we can move freely in the space rather than attempting neurotically to 
deny its existence. Paradoxically, the boundary that marks the space begins, in a 
sense, to give way. It does not dissolve, to be sure; rather it takes on a certain 
elasticity. 
Through the process of what I will call dereification, we can restore 
words, and—this is the crucial point—through words, selves, to this elasticity. 
Dereification is the process by which the solidity—the certainty—around one’s 
concepts and memories (of the mémoire volontaire) begins to soften and dissolve, 
until one feels no authority or possessiveness over them, until they are weightless. 
Consider the description of one form of reification in The Collector: 
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Orange light sprays across your face. 
 
You are still in the window,  
chokethroated, swallowing the sharp 
and blue-aired, the unlit 
yet glowing squares of time—photographs 
once trapped and taped to the wall, now drifting 
and circling: ghostmoments. 
       And you, 
just supposed to open your mouth to them. 
To swallow and erupt them transformed 
into the very cells of your being: technicolor 
sphinx moths that hatch in swarms, 
but die instantly in ashen piles. 
       And you, 
just supposed to stick the tiny carcasses  
to your boneframe with silver pins; to fashion  
a skin of all your time. You are still  
in the window, collecting your moments;  
 
bedecking. 
 
In this piece, moments undergo a metamorphosis within the self in which they are 
transformed from dynamic moments into a past, a personal history, a vestment of 
dead moments that cyclically constitute the ‘self.’ In dereification, then, the ‘self’ 
becomes overwhelmed. This can invoke a feeling of terror: it is as if the moths 
reanimate while they are being worn and, flapping their wings, manage to 
extricate themselves from their pins. At first they cover the self in swarms—
overwhelm the self, so to speak—but then, they take flight, and leave the self with 
no cloak, no vestment with which to identify. The experience of selfhood ceases 
to be viable. One’s claim on reality, so to speak, gives way, and what is left, if the 
process is successful, is awareness in the absence of selfhood, Mind freed from 
the dead weight of identity.  
This absolutely can be as transgressive an experience as it may sound: this 
process can be induced by certain forms of intoxication, namely psychedelic. 
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Inducing dereification chemically, however, can be a gamble. One can, it is true, 
experience ecstasy at the dissolution of self, but it is also possible to lose 
awareness along with selfhood, and so become blathering and psychotic, or 
paranoid, or vapid and dull. Also, as with any chemically induced experience, it is 
temporary, and, as the self reconstitutes itself as the chemical effects wear off, it 
is to easy to later consider the experience as merely a ‘trip’ and not a real 
possibility for experience.  
The alternative, of course, is to gradually allow the process of 
dereification to unfold in a practice of meditation. In meditation, the self or ego is 
not denied, as it is sometimes thought, as the denial of ‘self’ still maintains the 
reality of a self in a kind of negative-reification. Instead, the workings of the 
egoself are observed from the position of the (in Buddhist terms) Essential Mind, 
the locus of awareness-without-self. The Lankavatara Scripture offers a 
description of a process of revealing Essential Mind, one which is ultimately a 
description of the dereification process described earlier: “When appearances and 
names are put away and all discrimination ceases, that which remains is the true 
and essential nature of things and, as nothing can be predicated as to the nature of 
essence, it is called the ‘Suchness’ of Reality.”54 Suchness is essence-without-ego 
(for in Buddhist terms ‘ego’ refers both to the ego-self of a human being and to 
the illusory, seemingly unique characteristics of inanimate objects; that which 
makes an object desirable) or, in human terms, it is awareness-without-self. This 
Suchness contains and is contained within everything, but it is obscured by the 
ego-self through which we see it, smell it, taste it, touch it, hear it, and—speak it. 
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It is exactly this Suchness that is encountered in the stopmoment, as in this 
untitled poem by Celan55: 
 
Mute autumn smells. The 
aster, unbent, passed 
through your memory 
between homeland and chasm. 
 
A strange lostness was 
bodily present, you came 
near to 
living. 
 
This strange lostness, the hauntedness of the mute autumn smells—could Celan 
be expressing anything other than Suchness? That he does not say so explicitly 
only compounds the effect: he does not say, “Look over here, at the Suchness of 
autumn, at the Suchness of your body!” Rather, he56 allows his words (even more 
exquisite in the original German) and his form to carry their Suchness with them, 
their ‘balloons of the Real.’  
 Suchness, then, like the Real or Reality, constitutes a space. It is quite 
similar to the aura in Walter Benjamin’s sense, the aura being the particular 
Suchness Benjamin ascribes to certain artworks prior to the possibility of their 
technological reproduction, when they were located in a definite time and place. 
In certain New Age spiritualities, the aura refers to the field—or space—of energy 
around an individual; it is like the energetic manifestation of the person’s essence 
projected beyond her physical body. The Benjaminian aura, then, could be 
considered the energetic manifestation of the (original) work of art. Benjamin 
himself calls it a “strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of a 
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distance, however near it may be.”57 In his essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Its Technological Reproducibility,” Benjamin traces what he calls the “decline” in 
the aura of the work of art. He writes, “In even the most perfect reproduction, one 
thing is lacking: the here and now of the work of art—its unique existence in a 
particular place.”58 Benjamin goes on to relate this temporal and spatial sense to 
“authenticity,”59 to which we can also relate Suchness.  
To say that this authenticity is diminished in the reproduction is therefore 
akin to noting that the Suchness of the piece is diminished as well. The 
reproduction takes on its own Suchness—there can be no duality of having or not 
having Suchness, which is the main distinction between Suchness and Benjamin’s 
aura—but this is not the Suchness of the original piece, and it is a Suchness that is 
heavily obscured by function, value, desirability, and so forth. The space, in other 
words, becomes filled in with arbitrary valuations. This is true not just of the art-
object, but also of language. As language becomes reduced to its signifying value 
and is used compulsively, its Suchness becomes increasingly overlooked by most 
people, and poetic expression is seen largely as overly emotive and obsolete, or 
even as something of which to be suspicious. Or, it is taken as ‘symbolic,’ as 
something that needs to be decoded in order to be understood. Indeed, this is the 
approach of most grade- and high school English classes, often the only places 
where poetry is encountered for many people. In this context, reading poetry 
becomes a chore, and whatever intuitive relationship one may feel with poetic 
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expression is overlooked if it cannot be translated into the discourse of symbol 
and code. To compound the effect, linguistic space is now largely appropriated by 
advertising and political rhetoric, both of which use the space to manipulate both 
meaning and linguistic associations in the listener or reader. Because Benjamin’s 
aura suffers decline under such a system, the aura cannot be reconstructed. But 
Suchness is only obscured, and can be rediscovered once the overgrowth covering 
it is cleared away.  
I said earlier that Suchness in language is that which induces the 
stopmoment. This, too, can be set into a Benjaminian model. Benjamin writes, 
“[K]nowledge comes only in lightening flashes. The text is the long roll of 
thunder that follows.”60 These “flashes” are, essentially, monadic: one must 
“discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of the total 
event;”61 they are flashes of awareness, moments of small yet significant 
awakenings, much like stopmoments. And, like stopmoments, they both spring 
from and generate text. Benjamin is discussing historical text rather than poetic 
expression, but the two are far from mutually exclusive. Text is the network of 
passageways between each monadic flash of awareness. The nodes and passages 
create a kind of scaffolding, a structure that contains and is contained within 
space. This is the space, the emptiness, within and around not only every body of 
text, but even every word and thing. It is the space of awakening, the pause that 
allows the flash, and the space within which the flash occurs and crystallizes and 
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generates. Without this pause, knowledge and language both become conformist 
and compulsive; habits of thought and expression based on rule and repetition 
rather than the flash of awareness. The following original poem, “Lament,” traces 
the speaker’s desperation for pause: 
 
Hurried eruptions from faces, 
whispered escapes  
into churning wordmills— 
 
Anxiously we finger our pens:  
take my word into your palm  
and press it there. 
 
The speaker senses that she is caught in the current of compulsive 
communication, but cannot seem to release herself. There is something she yearns 
to say, something beyond the scope of the compulsory system of expression and 
reception, but it remains ineffable to her and unabsorbable to any reader or hearer. 
This is the point in experience at which language might begin to seem unviable, 
or inadequate for full expression. The compulsory model is cyclical, so that the 
ineffability and unabsorbability preclude each other’s amelioration; the speaker’s 
mouth is crusted over with words that no longer possess any valence. Another 
poem, “Powerlines,” also expresses the agony of this particular kind of silence, 
which I will call voicelessness—for this is not an open, empty silence, rather, it is 
the silence that stretches like thin plastic across the face, the silence that 
suffocates. 
 
a cloud erupts from her throat   
a thousand schoolfish breathing  
a shadow  a murder of crows  
the black music of six-a.m.-and-sleepless— 
not Language only  
       black cries up to the milky swell— 
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and suddenly they are simply        gone  
he beside her breathing  
       a concerto into noiselessness   
 
once in thirds with the great black mass of sound 
 
my voice flew away    my voice perched on the 
powerlines       my voice 
waiting for an open throat 
 
watching with black eyes swallowing
 swallowing 
 
no open throats  just round staring heads frozen 
        mute  
 
she lays a hand over his mouth  
to start the thaw 
 
—the black voice watching from the powerlines  
 
 
* * * 
 
the crows return 
 
his jaw tingles the world     dries up  
outside  
 
a shock of light         my voice 
 
     a crow with one white  
 
     feather 
 
waiting for an open throat  
 
that last slit of light sipping all the breath from the air 
staring over the great grey nightway        one white  
         eye  my 
voice 
 
perched on the powerlines     
          my wind         my wave      
           my black dying star 
 
my voice flew away      
          my voice 
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Notice the increase of literal space as the poem progresses. At the beginning, 
there is a marked sense of desperation—it is as if the speaker (in the italicized 
lines) is crying dumbly for her voice to return, while observing that the others 
around her are frozen voiceless as well. It is not a silence that pervades: as silence 
is the space between moments of expression, where there is no expression, there 
can be no silence either, and, subsequently, no space, which is reflected in the 
form. The poem begins to open up after the lapse of time signaled by the three 
asterisks; some kind of spring has arrived, and the call for the voice is now not so 
much a cry as it is a mantra, not so much a struggle within voicelessness as it is an 
expression of that state. It is as if the overwhelming frustration actually induces 
transcendence, as sometimes occurs when dealing with unfathomable physical 
pain. For in many Buddhist sects, including the Tibetan tradition that is 
predominant in this project, a distinction is drawn between the body’s pain and 
the mind’s reaction to it. The mind can learn how to detach itself from the pain, to 
step back and calmly observe the pain rather than reacting against it mentally. By 
not allowing the ego—that which ‘feels’ the pain as such; that which experiences 
it as ‘my’ pain—to react defensively, the Mind essentially bypasses the ego and 
the pain becomes an opportunity for meditation rather than for ego reinforcement. 
In this poem, then, the mind detaches from the pain and searing frustration of 
voicelessness—it ceases to resist that state—and only then is it, paradoxically, 
able to express that state with a kind of melancholic beauty.  
Similarly, the struggle with compulsive expression can be transmuted into 
a sort of linguistic meditation on that very state. In writing, this is the moment in 
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which the hands tingle, the heart beats in triplets, and a flush comes over the face, 
but in which the mind is both focused and utterly detached. It is not carrying out 
some conscious plan as it creates, and yet the process is, to a certain extent, 
tangible and transparent to it. This Mind feels no ownership over what it creates 
and yet, it takes a sort of terrified joy in it, as though the entire precious creation 
might combust and disappear at any time. This awe has the potential to 
completely transform one’s relationship to the self. Consider this poem by Rilke, 
in which the speaker professes ignorance of and wonder at the self, and yet 
manages by the end to arrive at one of the fundamental tenets of Buddhist 
enlightenment: 
Ignorant before the heavens of my life, 
I stand and gaze in wonder. Oh the vastness 
of the stars. Their rising and descent. How still. 
As if I didn't exist. Do I have any 
share in this? Have I somehow dispensed with 
their pure effect? Does my blood's ebb and flow 
change with their changes? Let me put aside 
every desire, every relationship 
except this one, so that my heart grows used to 
its farthest spaces. Better that it live 
fully aware, in the terror of its stars, than 
as if protected, soothed by what is near.62 
Better, indeed to live fully aware than soothed by what is near—‘what is near’ 
being the protective film of the ego. When the ego is pulled away, or at the very 
least circumnavigated and seen beyond (because, in psychoanalytic thought, the 
ego is seen not so much as something to be destroyed as it is something to be 
renovated) what is left of the self may feel frighteningly vulnerable and exposed; 
in Lacan’s terms, the self is forced to come face to face with its own lack, which 
can bring insurmountable anguish if the person is not spiritually or 
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psychologically prepared, as mentioned in the discussion of dereification above. 
There is at the same time, however, the potential for sheer openness, a return to 
the “basic ground” discussed by Trungpa. Through a full, meditative awareness of 
the state of terror, one can actually move out of it, and toward an embrace of the 
startling vastness. Energies that were previously committed to the ego’s 
preservation can then, in the state of openness, be put toward play—within 
physical space, within linguistic space—and unlike the ego, which is only capable 
of consumption, play is truly generative. The ego devours and regurgitates words, 
things, and experiences, while in play they are created spontaneously, simply 
because there is something the Mind wants to express to which the existing terms, 
objects, events, and so forth are not quite conducive.  
When the Mind plays within linguistic space, language evolves. This is, of 
course, not the only factor in its evolution; misuses that first become idiomatic 
and later become accepted as the norms also contribute. But linguistic play differs 
from this latter process in one quite important way. Though its results are not 
generally consciously intended, linguistic play is a conscious endeavor. When a 
word or phrase is misused and then assimilated, the perpetrators of the misuse 
often do not know or do not care that they are speaking ‘incorrectly.’63 The player 
knows, at the very least, that she is playing with language, though whatever new 
permutations come out of her play may come as surprises even to her.  
New compounds that use very common formal elements, such as -ness,  
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-less, un-, and so forth, provide the player with an opportunity to express a 
thought that has never before actually been expressed in quite that way, or, if it 
has at some point throughout time, not enough to become a real part of the form 
(in other words, a commonly expressed idea). Saussure posited analogy—or new 
words constructed from preexisting components—as the predominant creative 
force within language: “Analogy is responsible for all the normal modifications of 
the external aspect of words which are not due to sound change.”64 For Saussure, 
“Every time a new creation is definitely accepted and ousts its rival, there is truly 
something created and something abandoned.”65 But the ‘new creation’ does not 
have to be assimilated into everyday speech before it constitutes a new creation. 
And, in fact, most of these new creations do not supercede older terms, rather, 
they exist in parallel, and the proliferation of terms allows for increasingly precise 
and intuitive expression. This is not only true of new terms formed with prefixes 
and suffixes. Compounds made up of two complete words effectively fuse two 
words, and therefore two sets of connotations, into one. When words follow one 
another in a series (“the state of being without space”) each word qualifies the one 
or ones adjacent to it, and the mind must make sense of the relationships. 
Spacelessness, on the other hand, conveys one clean image: as Saussure wrote, 
“We find countless cases where a change in the signal brings with it a change in 
the idea expressed.”66 When two words are at play, the effect is compounded, as 
in this piece, “recollections of a stepmother who has gone.” 
 
                                                 
64
 Saussure 160  
65
 Saussure 168 
66
 Saussure 119  
51 
it’s the blue that refuses to turn or the smell 
of oranges and rain that used to follow your hair like a 
description— 
 
you expand on my palm like a sponge unclutched your softness 
is paralyzing I turn blue I harden 
so that you can not take me in you like 
to take me in these stillblue dusks 
 
when I was four sleeping mouthbreathing you slid 
a furl of paper down my throat I was a bottle 
for your message a museum for your selves 
tacked to the inside of my chest cavity your eyes were holes 
that watched me breathe 
I darkened as you watched as I 
darkened my darkening 
darkened your eyes we exchange  
darknesses in the stillblue your eyes 
are holes that watch me breathe.  
 
I simply could not find a way to convey the static twilit glow that came over my 
childhood bedroom each night in a way that suited the poem. So, I typed the poem 
out on a typewriter a number of times, with each draft differing from the one that 
preceded it. It was as though each time I fed a new page into the machine and 
began to write, I was beginning entirely from scratch. In maybe the fifth draft, 
stillblue appeared on the page. I muttered it to myself a few times and my hands 
began to tingle. Constructing a particularly apt new compound can only be 
described as spiritual; one has effectively given birth to an expression that would 
have miscarried otherwise. The new term plays like a mantra on the Mind. The 
sense is never that I created a new term; rather, it is as though it always existed in 
potential and I animated it, gave it voice, called it out of its virtual existence and 
into actuality. This is not to say that every author or speaker of poetic expression 
is utterly detached from their creation, nor that the creative process is similar or 
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even comparable among writers, but my own experience serves as an example of 
a generative process of actualization.  
 
 It would be lovely—and very convenient for the sake of this project—if 
there were an adroitly rational, prescriptive way in which I could conclude. In 
truth, there is not. I can only urge you, my readers, to rediscover the Suchness of 
language, to allow each word that you encounter to pierce the protective film of 
your egos so that oppressive ego-clutter and false consciousness can be 
dismantled, and replaced by a joyous embrace of space. It must be remembered 
that language preceded and will outlive us, that it is the way we impart experience 
to one another, and that its very transmission across time constitutes the collective 
memory known as history. If we do not seize the command of our utterances from 
our egos, we will forget, and perhaps even lose our inherent spiritual connection 
to language, and our words will grow heavy, and lifeless, and dark. We must 
remember that we can learn to receive each expression with openness, and let it 
burn into us, and within us—  
 
(Birthright) 
 
One word recalls the span of a single present long after its death 
as the flickering darkness  
recalls a star who died long  
before its light shot through our blinking perception— 
 
We dance with cadavers whose voices lit the sky.  
 
One word: contours gleaming with a holographic nowness, 
each curve tasted on the tongue, 
each pointed piece of space 
jutting through the skin of the mouth, shattered and at once whole in itself— 
 
They passed the flame to our mouths and died for us. 
53 
 
One word echoes over the chasm between our selves and our 
selves cast it into space: 
moonlight exploding against a wall  
and thrown back toward its waning source: 
 
We will kiss you with this word, and you will set us  
 
ablaze.  
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Project Summary 
When I began this project, I, like most honors students, had absolutely no 
idea what form it would end up taking. In the four years leading up to the project 
three of my interests ripened into insatiable passions: poetry, religion (particularly 
Tibetan Buddhism), and psychoanalysis. I was relatively well-versed in the first 
two, and had only a vague conception of the third—I’d read a good amount of 
Freud’s work but had not yet thoroughly digested it, so to speak—and I knew that 
the only project on which I could possibly focus for almost two years would have 
to incorporate all three.  
 Then I encountered Lacan, and his notion of the unconscious as structured 
by language. Here I was, trying to find a way to express my spiritual connection 
to language, and Lacan posits that language constitutes a part of my very being. I 
had the opportunity in Professor Gates’ ETS 340 class, No Such Thing, to get a 
crash course in Lacanian psychoanalysis. I bought the new edition of the Ecrits, 
one year (1959-60) of his seminar, and two companion books by clinician Bruce 
Fink, and I dug in.  
 Exploring the Buddhist aspect of the project proved to be a bit trickier. I 
could find no courses that corresponded to what I wanted to learn and read, so I 
set off on my own…and realized that the only books available on the subject here 
in Syracuse were either much too cursory or too self-help oriented (except for 
Chögyam Trungpa’s work, much of which I already owned). I abhor buying 
books online unless I know exactly what I need, or am buying en mass. I really 
wanted to browse through a variety of in-depth, preferably primary, texts on the 
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subject. Luckily, I had the opportunity when I took a cross-country road trip over 
the winter of 2008-9 and ended up in Boulder, CO, arguably the Mecca of Tibetan 
Buddhism in America. Here I found the “Buddhist Bible,” a collection of sutras 
translated from Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese, edited by Dwight Goddard, which 
proved most useful. I also discovered a few other texts that served as excellent 
background reading.  
 I wanted the project to be a patchwork of sorts. I knew that I was working 
with at least three separate discourses, and I wanted to leave them mostly intact; I 
did not want to reduce Buddhism and psychoanalysis, for example, to a series of 
vague parallels, and yet I did want to show the connections between them. This 
was a difficult balance to strike, especially when, through conversations with my 
advisor, Dr. M. Gail Hamner, Deleuze’s text on Bergson and various works of 
Benjamin’s were added into the equation. Dr. Hamner recommended that I use 
Deleuze’s Bergsonism to frame my use of the terms real, virtual and actual. Upon 
reading the text, I knew I wanted to use it in the introduction, but there was one 
issue. I was already using the word real in at least three separate senses: in 
Lacan’s sense, in which the ‘Real’ is that order of existence that remains 
untouched and unmediated by language (or, in Lacan’s terms, by the ‘Symbolic’); 
in the Buddhist sense, in which the highest ‘Reality’ refers to what is experienced 
by the enlightened Mind; and in the colloquial sense, where ‘reality’ refers to the 
tangible environment. Introducing Deleuze’s text added yet another usage of the 
term into the project (real:possible::actual:virtual). On the one hand, I was 
enchanted with the plurality of uses and meanings that could be attributed to one 
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word; it seemed a perfect example of the linguistic space that I discuss in the 
project. On the other hand, there was still the issue of keeping all the usages 
straight and presenting them in a way such that each distinct usage was clear.  
In Benjamin’s case, I felt a deep kinship with his work from the moment I 
encountered it, when I took Dr. Hamner’s REL 600 Religion and Revolution 
seminar in the fall of my junior year—so much so that I took a Benjamin seminar 
through the honors department in the spring semester of my senior year. As I 
mentioned above, most of Benjamin’s work focuses on culture and history, and, 
subsequently, on memory and text. He was writing in Germany in the 1920s and 
30s, during Hitler’s rise to power. Benjamin sought to deconstruct the narrative, 
progress-driven conception of history—what he labeled ‘Historicism’—that 
prevailed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, because he saw this 
version of history as culminating, ultimately, in Fascism. Benjamin counters 
Historicism with what he calls ‘historical materialism,’ in which the historical 
narrative is torn open so that the lost moments—those that did not fit into the 
narrative and were consequently forgotten—can shine through. Benjamin’s model 
of history is, then, more constellatory than linear, and it is a model in which the 
importance of (and truth within) space is constantly reiterated, whether it is the 
space among the moment-stars that comprise the constellation or the space among 
thoughts, or words. I found Benjamin’s work very useful in discussing linguistic 
space.  
 The Spiritual Value of Poetic Expression is really a lifework of sorts (at 
least, so far). Poetry has been my best-liked and yet my most fickle companion 
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since I was about six years old. I never felt as though I had complete command 
over my writing. It felt instead as though I was a channel or medium through 
which the poems could come alive and take flight. When I first read Freud’s 
description of the oceanic feeling, I immediately understood it, for it was how I’d 
always felt toward language—like it was something so vast and enigmatic that all 
I could do was stand in front of it in awe, and sometimes take a nighttime swim: I 
pictured words sticking to my skin like bioluminescent plankton. Poetry and 
spirituality have always been inextricable from one another for me, and this 
brought me to poets like Rilke and Celan, both of whom write poems that are, in a 
sense, psalms or sutras. In this project, I wanted to analyze what it is about poetic 
expression that makes it so conducive to spiritual ecstasy, despair and 
detachment.  
 
 
 
 
 
